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Putting the History Back into Ethnicity:
Enslavement, Religion, and Cultural
Brokerage in the Construction of
Mandinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime
Identities in West Africa, c. 1650–1930
PAUL NUGENT
University of Edinburgh
It does not always happen that academic debates result in an agreed victory or a
tidy consensus. As often as not, the protagonists lose interest, or the terrain
itself shifts. For that reason, it is worth remarking on the fact that after
around two decades of debating the roots of ethnicity in Africa, something
like a consensus has in fact emerged. The colonial thesis that Africans were
born into “tribes” that were rooted in a timeless past has been effectively cri-
tiqued by historians and social scientists alike. Arguably beginning with
John Iliffe, revisionists advanced a challenging antithesis, namely that colonial
administrative practices generated the very identities that ofﬁcials and mission-
aries took for granted.1 In Iliffe’s famous formulation: “The British wrongly
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1 There is a parallel here with the debate about caste in India. For a revisionist take on caste in
India, which focuses on the colonial crucible, see Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and
the Making of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). The position adopted by
Dirks in previous articles, and more extreme versions of colonial constructivism, are questioned by
Susan Bayly who notes, “Caste has been for many centuries a real and active part of social life, and
not just a self-serving orientalist ﬁction.” She sees the colonial caste system as neither fabricated nor
“a single static system . . . [that] has dominated Indian life since ancient times,” a position broadly
akin to the argument advanced here. See her The New Cambridge History of India IV.3: Caste,
Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), quote p. 4. Similarly, for an attempt to historicize communalism
in India, rather than portraying it as a purely colonial product, see C. A. Bayly, “The Pre-History
of Communalism,” Modern Asian Studies 19, 2 (1985): 177–203.
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believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to
function within the colonial framework.”2 Although Iliffe coined the term “the
creation of tribes,” it was Terence Ranger’s contribution to The Invention of
Tradition that really sparked an interest in the historicity of ethnicity in
Africa.3 In fact, this was only one facet of Ranger’s overall argument, one
that was a good deal more nuanced than he has sometimes been given credit
for. Be that as it may, the time was evidently ripe for a historiographical
break, and during the 1980s and 1990s historians set about demonstrating
that particular ethnic groups were indeed the product of an interplay between
European interventions—by administrators, missionaries, employers, and colo-
nial ethnographers—and selective African appropriations—through the agency
of Christian converts, educated elites, urban migrants, and rural patriarchs.4
The steady accretion of case-study material has subsequently culminated in
reﬂections that have distilled the broad comparative lessons.5 These have
been helpful in creating a sense of agreement that the debate was necessary,
whilst underscoring that a law of diminishing returns has set in, something
more generally true of debates about constructivist approaches to identity.
The net result is that neither the thesis nor the antithesis ﬁnds much favor
amongst historians today, at least in their pure forms. The idea that modern
2 John Iliffe,AModernHistory of Tanganyika (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1979), 318.
3 Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in Eric Hobsbawm and
Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 211–62.
4 The literature on this subject is now vast, but some of the most important case studies are
Terence Ranger, “Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in
Zimbabwe,” in Leroy Vail, ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London: James
Currey, 1989); J.D.Y. Peel, “The Cultural Work of Yoruba Ethnogenesis,” in E. Tonkin, Maryon
Macdonald, and Malcolm Chapman, eds., History and Ethnicity (London: Routledge, 1989);
H. Chimhundu, “Early Missionaries and the Ethnolinguistic Factor during the ‘Invention of Tribal-
ism’ in Zimbabwe,” Journal of African History 33, 1 (1992): 87–109; John Lonsdale, “The Moral
Economy of MauMau: The Problem”; and “TheMoral Economy of MauMau:Wealth, Poverty and
Civic Virtue in Kikuyu Political Thought,” both in Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, eds.,
Unhappy Valley: Conﬂict in Kenya and Africa (London: James Currey 1992), 265–314,
315–504; Justin Willis, “The Makings of a Tribe: Bondei Identities and History,” Journal of
African History 33, 1992: 191–208; David Killingray, “Imagined Martial Communities: Recruiting
for the Military and the Police in Colonial Ghana, 1860–1960,” in Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent,
eds., Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2000), 119–36; Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo
Frontier: The Lie of the Borderlands Since 1914 (Athens and Oxford: Ohio University Press and
James Currey, 2002); Dmitri van den Bersselaar, “Imagining Home: Migration and the Igbo
Village in Colonial Nigeria,” Journal of African History 46, 1 (2005): 51–73; Axel Harneit-Sievers,
Constructions of Belonging: Igbo Communities and the Nigerian State in the Twentieth Century
(Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2006); and Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making of
History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press/International Africa Institute,
2006).
5 Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial Africa,” in
Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan, eds., Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century
Africa (London: Macmillan, 1993), 62–111; and Thomas Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the
Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa,” Journal of African History 44, 1 (2003): 3–27.
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‘tribes’ are rooted in the mists of time ﬂies in the face of the fact that the Igbo of
Nigeria, for example, only began to coalesce in the interwar period. But
equally, the ‘invention’ paradigm assumes that identities are donned and
shed according to a short-term and largely instrumentalist logic. It seems
much more likely that the boundaries of self-identiﬁcation have constantly
mutated in line with the shifting conﬁgurations of space and power.6 Colonial
structures certainly did force Africans to rethink their relations with their neigh-
bors, but there is no reason to believe that this was the ﬁrst time this had
occurred. For example, Islamic reformism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century West Africa produced a complex interplay between religious and
ethnic identities that remain salient for inter-group relations to this day. By
focusing attention on the ways in which identities have mutated—whether
by a process of scaling up (as in the Igbo case) or by a process of segmentation
(for example, between pastoralist and sedentary Fulani/Fulbe across West
Africa)—one is signaling an important element of continuity-within-change.
Importantly, these processes have left historical stretch-marks that are evident
to this day. Tony Cohen’s interpretation of symbolism as a mnemonic trigger that
helps to connect past and present precisely because of the “very imprecision of
the references to the past” is worth bearing in mind.7 But this is also a rather pre-
sentist formulation. The very act of shifting the markers of identity at some point
in the past may become encoded in memory, which, in turn, may be ritualized
and expressed in symbolic forms. A similar argument has been made for the
internalization of memories of the slave trade, most notably by Rosalind Shaw,
but it has a wider application.8 For West Africanists, perhaps the classic example
is the founding myth of the Asante state, which held that the Golden Stool des-
cended from the sky and thereafter embodied the soul (sumsum) of a single
Asante people. This was part of a very practical project of binding hitherto sep-
arate Akan chiefdoms into an integral political unit at the start of the eighteenth
century, even if the pre-existing foci of identiﬁcation were never entirely erased.9
In this case and countless others, symbolism is not just a present-day pursuit
that stands outside historical processes—looking back at them, as it were, from
6 This argument is presented in more detail in Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent, “Ethnicity in
Ghana: A Comparative Perspective,” in C. Lentz and P. Nugent, eds., Ethnicity in Ghana: The
Limits of Invention (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 1–28. The contribution
of Sandra Greene to this same volume makes the point clearly. It is developed at greater length
in Sandra Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: A History of
the Anlo-Ewe (Portsmouth and London: Heinemann and James Currey, 1996).
7 Anthony Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (London: Routledge, 1989), 102–4.
8 For an insightful account of the ways in which memory works over time, see the introduction to
Rosalind Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade: Ritual and the Historical Imagination in Sierra
Leone (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002). See also, Judy Rosenthal, Posses-
sion, Ecstacy and Law in Voodoo (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1998).
9 On the ideological underpinnings of the Asante monarchy, see T. C. McCaskie, State and
Society in Pre-Colonial Asante (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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afar—but may be deeply embedded within them right from the start. In seeking to
rescue Bourdieu’s concept of habitus from the charge that it posits a “closed cycle
of repetitive change,” Shawmakes the following pertinent observation about how
thepast and the present canbe connected throughmemory: “People donot respond
as tabulae rasae when they construct and confront transformative events and
political processes; rather, experiences of those events and processes that
become sedimented as memory are themselves mediated and conﬁgured by
memory. From such a position we can recast persistence, recurrence, and repro-
duction as integral parts of transformation and innovation rather than as their
antithesis.”10
The implication is that a fuller understanding of the dynamics of African
identity requires some sense of longer-range processes, especially in West
Africa where the roots of many contemporary identities can be traced back
several centuries. Unfortunately, this is something that the debate about ethni-
city in Africa, with its very modern frame of reference, has obscured. This
paper makes a case for putting the history back into the study of African iden-
tities. I focus on the evolution of two sets of paired identities in West Africa
where it is possible to impart some time-depth to questions of identity: those
of the Mandinka and the Jola (or Diola) in what is now the Casamance
region of Senegal and the Gambia, and the Ewe and the Agotime of what is
now the Ghana-Togo borderlands. These cases are by no means exceptional,
and in some respects a fuller case could be made for other parts of West
Africa where the historical record is even richer.11 The aim here is partly to
recharge the debate about African ethnicities and partly to bring this debate
to a wider audience that is interested in matters of identity construction.
H OW FA R W E R E W E S T A F R I C A N I D E N T I T I E S E T H N I C ?
At least one African historian has warned against the dangers of reading ethnicity
back into the pre-colonial past. In the words of Donald Wright, “Ethnicity as we
think of it—a clear identity with, and strong loyalties to, an ethnic group—almost
certainly did not exist in precolonial Africa.”Writing with special reference to the
Gambia, he observes that identities were a “permeable membrane through which
passed marriage partners, members of secret societies or occupational groupings,
magico-religious ﬁgures (Muslims and non-Muslims) and just about everybody
else.”12 This echoes the observation that Iliffe made with respect to what is now
Tanzania in the 1970s.13 The point is well-taken: there is abundant evidence that
10 Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade, 10, see also 4–5.
11 See, for example, Allen E. Howard and David E. Skinner, “Network Building and Political
Power in Northwestern Sierra Leone, 1800–65,” Africa 54, 2 (1984): 2–28.
12 Donald Wright, “What Do You Mean There Were No Tribes in Africa? Thoughts on
Boundaries—and Related Matters—in Pre-Colonial Africa,” History in Africa 26 (1999): 409–26.
13 In the words of Iliffe, “Early nineteenth-century Tanganyika was not inhabited by discrete,
compact and identiﬁable tribes, each with a distinct territory, language, culture and political
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before the twentieth century Africans were multi-lingual, held multiple self-
ascriptions, shifted their identities, forged wider networks, and valued themselves
on the basis of other criteria such as occupation and caste. However, no ethnicity
has ever been hermetically sealed or free-ﬂoating. The points that Wright makes
would hold equally well for the contemporary period, but there would be little
sense in denying the salience of ethnicity today. One reasonwhy he is so emphatic
is in order to counter the colonial image of a continent populated by so many dis-
tinct ‘tribes.’ But at this stage, it is arguably superﬂuous to continue insisting on
this point, and historianswould be better advised to concentrate on understanding,
in far greater detail, how identities were shaped and reinforced through everyday
practice prior to the advent of colonialism.
The sources that are available to historians of pre-colonial African identities
are the familiar ones. Firstly, there are the European written accounts of the ﬁf-
teenth to the nineteenth centuries. Because they are written from the ‘outside,’
they may misconstrue some realities and simplify complexities. But their weak-
ness is also their greatest strength, namely that they tend to identify the broad
contours of inter-group boundaries with some clarity. It is true that they do not
present a world of permeable membranes (Wright) or groups that merge seam-
lessly into each other (Iliffe). The reality they typically present is a rather one-
dimensional one, but Europeans were also rather good at describing what they
did comprehend. It might be argued that Europeans simply imposed their cog-
nitive grid on African realities, but this is not terribly convincing. European
observers tended to know their limitations and typically sought the help of
African intermediaries—that is, interpreters in a cultural as well as a linguistic
sense—who, in the process of codifying realities systematized everyday per-
ceptions about the relationship between one group and the next. The exercise
was selective, of course, but it portrayed one aspect of a lived reality.
There were two ﬁlters at work: African interpreters codiﬁed and transmitted
basic information, while their European counterparts ﬁtted what they heard into
their own cognitive grids. But precisely because Europeans were unfamiliar
with their ﬁelds of observation, they tended to relay information as faithfully
as they could. The standard format of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
texts by traders and travelers to West Africa contains discrete—one might
almost say disembodied—sections in which detailed description is interspersed
with passages that represent the author’s own opinions about the similarities
and differences between European and African ways of doing things. The
former represent almost an off-stage concession to the reader that the author
system . . . Normally one group merged imperceptibly into another” (Modern History, 8–9). For a
very similar statement with respect to West Africa, see Carola Lentz, “Contested Identities: The
History of Ethnicity in Northwestern Ghana,” in C. Lentz and Paul Nugent, eds., Ethnicity in
Ghana: The Limits of Invention (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 137–38.
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has limited conﬁdence in his ability to interpret behavior, and so faithfully
records it for others to reﬂect upon. Whereas the more opinionated passages
may now only be useful for getting at the workings of the European mind,
the descriptive ones remain extremely useful to the historian because they
are unburdened by the self-conﬁdent authorial voice. Hence it is difﬁcult to
read Richard Jobson’s description of societies living along the Gambia River
in 1620–1621 without being impressed by the fundamental familiarity of the
world he describes and its resonance on points of detail with ethnographic
accounts written in the twentieth century.14 Not every writer was such an
astute observer, but very many were—and, crucially for our purposes, they
took matters of identity very seriously.
The second kind of source consists of the oral traditions of peoples who
inhabit the regions today. These present a version of reality that does not
necessarily clash with that of European accounts. If anything, they glide past
each other, only sometimes achieving mutual recognition when they describe
the same particular events. Whereas this is often the cause of frustration,
what I wish to argue is that this is actually rather fortunate for the historian
because they add in the dimensions that may be missing from the European
accounts. European observers tended to focus on royal courts and trading
towns—and took the trouble to inscribe these on maps—while oral traditions
tend to relate the histories of particular lineages and ruling groups that are
not spatially bounded in quite the same way. These relate to both courts and
trading towns, but they also recount the histories of settlements that Europeans
had no interest in and never visited. Moreover, these oral traditions display
webs of interconnectedness in a way that European accounts never could.15
Putting these different sources together enables one to write history in some-
thing approximating a multidimensional fashion. A familiar objection is that
oral traditions are often difﬁcult to reconcile, or that they tell an ofﬁcial
history that may gloss over inconvenient realities—as with the traditions
recounted by the Mandinka jeli or praise-singers. But, once again, their weak-
ness can also be a strength, at least when it comes to writing up questions of
identity. For the complex map they provide of the relations between ruling
lineages is essential for making sense of identity, if only from the top down.
The lack of ﬁt between the various traditions may also be signiﬁcant in its
own right because it may point to dissonance in a relationship—sometimes
offering a perspective from the periphery or even from below. These again
enable the historian to approach the question of identity from a presumption
of complexity. To rule the modern concept of ethnicity out of court with
respect to the pre-colonial period is to risk creating an artiﬁcial rupture
14 Richard Jobson, The Golden Trade or a Discovery of the River Gambra and the Golden Trade
of the Aethiopians (1st. ed. 1623; rev. ed. by Walter Rodney) (London: Dawsons, 1968).
15 Howard and Skinner, “Network Building.”
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between colonialism and what came before it, whereas historians need to look
for the concatenations over time. Some would maintain that the concept of eth-
nicity is misleading, or even demeaning to Africans, and that “nation” would
provide a more appropriate terminology. However, the baggage attached to
the term “nation” by virtue of its association with the history of Europe in
the eighteenth and more especially the nineteenth century creates more pro-
blems than it resolves.16 Ethnicity, which we may take to refer to any form
of ‘we-they’ distinction, is more open-ended and has the advantage that it
does not presume any particular political form. That is, it can coexist with
states and decentralized political forms, as we will see. Having presented a
case for taking the pre-colonial matrices of identity seriously, I turn now to
the two sets of case studies.
Mapping Mandinka and Jola in the Senegambia
The assemblage of peoples living along the Gambia River were visited by a
succession of European traders over some ﬁve centuries, some of whom
took the effort to record what they witnessed. Europeans, mostly French and
Portuguese, also passed back and forth along the Casamance river further
south and relayed back information of a similar kind. These written records,
normally accompanied by maps, are helpful in forming a picture of the cultures
and identities of peoples living between the Gambia and the Casamance rivers,
although these become more fuzzy with distance from the respective river
banks and the nomenclature shifts repeatedly.17 Moreover, the picture consists
of a series of snapshots, often punctuated by long gaps. Oral traditions have
been collected more recently, and in the Gambian case, this has been system-
atically done.18 These provide a qualitatively different set of data for the
same inter-riverine region. One thing that emerges clearly enough from the
written and oral sources alike is that the region in question used to be inhabited
by Bainuk (or Bainunka) peoples who were subjected to demographic pressure
from Jola- and Mandinka-speaking peoples. The eventual outcome was that the
Bainuks were reduced to very small pockets, to the extent that they have
become virtually invisible today.19 This should not be taken to mean,
however, that there was a single Bainuk tribe that was dramatically displaced
by an inﬂux of Jola and Mandinka settlers. There were distinct Bainuk polities
16 It is also anachronistic for the reason that not all of those Europeans who visited and wrote
about Africa can be said to have belonged to nation-states.
17 For an extended discussion of the problems with European labels, see Peter Mark, A Cultural,
Economic, and Religious History of the Basse Casamance since 1500 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1985), ch. 2.
18 Bakary Sidibe´ of the Oral History Division in Banjul has coordinated the collection of this
important oral documentation.
19 In their run-down of the peoples of the Gambia, Arnold Hughes and David Perfect do not
mention the Bainuks. See their book, A Political History of the Gambia, 1816–1994 (Rochester:
University of Rochester Press, 2006), 12–24.
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and a network of trade linking the two river systems that their traders con-
trolled. It is even more misleading to imagine that the Bainuks were casualties
of a pre-colonial genocide, a term that Roche unwisely invokes in his otherwise
reliable history of the Casamance.20 The original Mandinka and Jola would
have arrived in small numbers and would in all likelihood have been forced
to accept the political dominance of Bainuk rulers. Gradually, the demographic
balance seems to have shifted, with the result that the Bainuk were eventually
absorbed into the Mandinka and Jola subgroups. Peter Mark puts the timing of
Jola penetration into Buluf (north of the Casamance river) as the start of the
seventeenth century. He notes that whereas Alvares d’Almada (writing in 1594)
only identiﬁed a Bainuk-speaking people called the Jabundos, Lemos Coelho
(in 1669) referred to “Felupos,” who later came to be known as Jolas.21
Today, Bainuk traces remain in place names and in family names like Koli,
Sambou, and Diatta.22
Oral traditions tend to present a more dramatic picture of events. Bainuk
accounts refer to the killing of one of their kings who cursed future generations,
predicting that they would forever be a subject people. In modern parlance, the
Bainuks were condemned to become deracinated. Mandinka and Jola traditions
refer to conquest, but this telescopes what was likely to have been a slow process
of cultural absorption. Indeed, Wright has gone as far as to suggest that there may
never have been large-scale Mandinka migrations into the Gambia River region.
Even relatively small groups of traders, who intermarried with local populations,
could have exerted a cultural inﬂuence that led to their hosts adopting a Man-
dinka identity, whilst preserving their earlier patronyms.23 However, this
surely presupposes a sufﬁciently large demographic presence for the Mandinka
to have exerted such an inﬂuence, rather than being absorbed themselves. There
certainly were bouts of open warfare between Bainuks and Jola groups in the
seventeenth century, but the latter did not emerge triumphant in a single war
or even a series of engagements. The Jola were initially on the receiving end
of enslavement by Bainuk rulers, as is clear from an account by Jajolet de la
Courbe relating to 1685–1687. However, a version of the same source makes
clear that Bainuk rulers felt the need to protect themselves against Jola attacks,
suggesting that the forces were ﬁnely balanced.24
20 Christian Roche, Histoire de la Casamance: conqueˆte et re´sistance, 1850–1920 (Paris:
Karthala, 1985), 23.
21 He also referred to “Usol,” which appears to indicate the village of Thionk-Essil. This would
have been a Bainuk settlement before becoming Jola. Mark, A Cultural, Economic, and Religious
History, 26–27. The term “Floup” is a source of some confusion because at times it has been taken
to refer to a particular subgroup, while at others it has been used for all those we today call Jola.
22 Mark, A Cultural Economic and Religious History, 19; Roche, Histoire, 26.
23 DonaldWright, “Beyond Migration and Conquest: Oral Traditions and Mandinka Ethnicity in
Senegambia,” History in Africa 12 (1985): 335–48.
24 The full description is missing from De la Courbe’s published account, but it is available
through the plagiarized text of J. B. Labat in 1728. Olga F. Linares, “Deferring to Trade in
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The oral traditions of the recent past convey some sense of the underlying
complexities. Roche refers to Bainuk traditions of migration from the direction
of the Gabou empire (in what is now Guinea-Bissau), and speciﬁcally to two
towns called Brikama—one being the large town in Kombo today—as settle-
ments founded by them.25 The tradition of migration from Gabou is also remem-
bered today by ruling lines in Mandinka towns in Kombo.26 They state that the
ﬁrst Mandinka settlers clashed with resident Bainuks who were there already,
forcing the former to seek reinforcements from Gabou.27 This could be taken
to mean that there were three waves of in-migration from Gabou: one by
Bainuks and two by Mandinkas. But it is also likely that the mixing of these
two peoples has also led to an admixture of traditions. Because many Mandinkas
today concede that their forebears were in fact Bainuks, it is extremely difﬁcult to
distinguish conquerors from conquered, or settlers from autochthons.
Unfortunately, Jobson’s seventeenth-century account, which is focused on
areas further upstream, says nothing about the Bainuk or the Jola peoples. It
does comment extensively on the Mandinka and their relations with the Fulbe.
The latter Johnson depicts rather sympathetically as the downtrodden clients
of their Mandinka neighbors, from whom they are distinguished by language,
physical appearance, and mode of living: “Their profession is keeping of
Cattle, some Goats they have, but the Heards they tend are Beefes, whereof
they are aboundantly stored: In some places they have settled Townes, but for
the most part they are still wandering; uniting themselves in kindred and families,
and so drive their heards together. . . . [T]he Mandingo, or Blacke-man applies
himselfe, at no time, in keeping or preserving of Cattle, but leaves it to the pai-
nefull Fulby.”28
Jobson’s account is perhaps over-drawn, but as a description of inter-ethnic
relations, it presents a recognizable account of the symbiosis between pastoral-
ists and agriculturalists. The terms ‘Mandingo’ and ‘Fulbe’ were clearly not of
Jobson’s invention: they were certainly used by the peoples who recognized
each other as ‘Other,’ despite living cheek by jowl. Jobson represents the
boundary between them as impermeable, but then it probably was relatively
hard because the ethnic markers were deﬁned by distinct livelihoods as
much as by language. Jobson’s rather negative views of the Mandinka are
also worth quoting because they resonate in interesting ways with later depic-
tions of a people given to the most minimalist efforts in farming: “The men, for
Slaves: The Jola of Casamance, Senegal in Historical Perspective,” History in Africa 14 (1987):
113–39, cite p. 20.
25 Roche, Histoire, 22–23.
26 Wright, “Beyond Migration,” 336, refers to Mandinka traditions that claim a direct origin
from Mali and others which refer to the settlers having come through Gabou.
27 Interview with Jerreh Demba et al., Kabadio, 19 Feb. 2004.
28 Jobson, The Golden Trade, 42–47.
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their parts, do live a most idle kinde of life, imploying themselves (I meane the
greater part) to no kinde of trade nor excercise, except it be onely some two
months of the yeare, which is in tilling, and bringing home their country
corne and graine, wherein the preservation of their lives consists, and in that
time their labour is sore.”29
When Francis Moore came to write about his travels along the Gambia River
in 1730, he drew a much more detailed picture. On the lower end of the river,
Moore identiﬁed three small kingdoms on the south bank that appear on the
accompanying map: Kombo, Fogny (or ‘Fonia), and Kiang (‘Caen’) (see
Map 1). About Fogny, Moore commented, “Inland it is very large, and gov-
erned by two Emperors, who are of a Banyoon [Bainuk] Race, which is a
sort of Floops, and have each their distinct Districts.”30 This passage is signiﬁ-
cant because it suggests the Bainuk ruling houses had not been entirely dis-
placed, but that they had also begun to merge into the “Floop” or Jola
population. In the case of Kiang, Moore observed that it was governed by Man-
dinkas, as were those kingdoms further along the river, but he referred to
‘Banyoons’ at the trading town of Geregia.31 Because Geregia had long been
an important crossroads linking Gambia/Casamance river trade routes with
European commerce, and because the Bainuk were reputed to be accomplished
traders, this is unsurprising.32
Moore commented speciﬁcally upon distinct groups living along the banks
of the Gambia River: “Mundingoes, Jolloifs [Wolofs], Pholeys [Fula/Fulbe],
Floops [Jolas], and Portuguese [Creoles].”33 On the map, the dotted lines desig-
nate kingdoms near the mouth of the river, but the other detail pinpoints popu-
lations that he presumably singled out because they stood in a problematic
relationship to authority. Hence “Pholeykunda” points to the existence of a
Fula settlement, while “Floops towns” similarly punctuate the cartographic
landscape. This a representation of a world in which Mandinkas, Jolas, and
Fulas lived very close to one another, but with the last two tending to resist cen-
tralizing tendencies on the part of those who called themselves mansas, or
kings.
Moore’s depiction of Fulbe agro-pastoralists is as positive as it is detailed,
noting that they “are not subject to any Kings of the Country, tho’ they live
in their Territories; for if they are ill-treated in one Nation, they break up
29 Ibid., 47–48.
30 Francis Moore, Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa (London: E. Cave, 1738), 24.
31. Ibid., 52.
32 The trading networks of the Bainuk have been examined by George Brooks, Eurafricans in
West Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender and Religious Observance from the Sixteenth to the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford and Athens: James Currey and Ohio University Press, 2003), 44–49.
Alvares d’Almada referred to the Bainuk trade at Geregia in his account, dating from around 1570.
Mark, A Cultural Economic and Religious History, 14–15.
33 Moore, Travels, 29.
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their towns, and remove to another.”34 But for our purposes, what is more
revealing is his portrayal of an ethnic frontier between the Mandinka and the
Jola (and Jola-ized Bainuk). This is worth quoting at length:
On the South-side of this River, over against James Fort, in the Empire of Fonia, and but
a little Way inland are a Sort of People called Floops, who are in a manner wild: they
border close to the Mundingoes and are bitter Enemies to each other. Their Country
is of a vast Extent, but they have no King among them, each of their Towns being for-
tiﬁed with Sticks drove all round and ﬁlled up with Clay: They are independent of each
other, and under the Government of no one Chief; notwithstanding which, they unite so
MAP 1 Section of Map Showing Mouth of the Gambia Accompanying Francis Moore’s, Travels
into the Inland Parts of Africa (1738).
34 Ibid., 30.
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ﬁrmly that all the force of the Mundingoes (tho’ so very numerous) cannot get the better
of them.35
This passage appears to contradict his earlier reference to “Banyoon Emperors,”
but, presumably, the point Moore was seeking to make is that the reach of these
supposed rulers over Jola villages was very limited. His depiction of ﬁercely
independent communities, who could nevertheless combine against a common
enemy, is replicated in reports about Jola society at the end of the nineteenth
century. Moreover, Moore’s depiction of Mandinka-“Floop” relations makes
clear that there was a real dividing line characterized by latent conﬂict, and
reinforced by culturally loaded differences. Whereas the Mandinkas traded
freely with the Europeans, and sold slaves to them, the “wild” Jolas maintained
a defensive posture against both groups. The fortiﬁcations they built were, at least
in frontier regions, defenses against Mandinka raiders who sold Jolas into the
slave trade.36 Moreover, the Jola were reputed to actively avoid direct European
contact, despite depending on trade for the acquisition of imported goods,
notably the iron with which they tipped their long hoes (or kanyendo).37
Although Roche claims that the Jola were not involved in the slave trade,
there is good evidence that Jola groups did in fact sell many of their captives
as slaves by the eighteenth century.38 These would often have been the result
of warring between villages. But crucially the Jola of Fogny and Buluf did not
build a society based on slavery, unlike the Mandinka and the Fula. The
second major difference was that the Jola were specialists in wetland rice cultiva-
tion. The productivity of their rice culture permitted relatively high population
densities, while the investment in ﬁelds that needed to be desalinated presup-
posed a considerable measure of communal cooperation in the absence of a hier-
archical political structure.39 Hence, the supposedly anarchic nature of the Jola,
as perceived by Mandinkas and Europeans alike, belied a high degree of social
organization. Finally, although many Mandinka were nominal Muslims, there
was a perceived correlation between the two. European travelers of the
35 Ibid., 35–36.
36 On the strategies used to defend against enslavement in the sub-region, which included
retreating into swampy areas and the building of fortiﬁcations, see Peter Mark, “Portuguese”
Style and Luso-African Identity: Precolonial Senegambia, Sixteenth–Nineteenth Centuries (Bloo-
mington: Indiana University Press, 2002); and Walter Hawthorne, Planting Rice and Harvesting
Slaves: Transformations along the Guinea-Bissau Coast, 1400–1900 (Portsmouth: Heinemann,
2003).
37 By way of an anecdote, Moore himself refers to the hostile reception accorded to a vessel that
ran aground in the Casamance, a theme echoed in a number of Portuguese sources.
38 A detailed account of the deep-rooted impact of slave trading on one Jola society, based on
shrine histories, is provided in Robert Baum, Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola Religion and
Society in Precolonial Senegambia (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). The
changing involvement of the Jola, traced through European sources, is provided by Linares, “Defer-
ring to Trade,” 113–39.
39 Olga Linares, Power, Prayer and Production: The Jola of Casamance, Senegal (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries commented repeatedly on their encounters
withMandinka marabouts. By contrast, the Jolas were portrayed as untouched by
Islam, which indeed they were until the end of the nineteenth century.
Moore’s account is also tantalizing for what it reveals about ethnic stereotyp-
ing. The “wild Floops” were clearly a Mandinka construct, which partly reﬂected
aMuslim disdain for “paganism.” ButMoore also goes on to present a rather more
qualiﬁed image of this group: “These Floops have the Character never to forgive,
or let the least Injury go unrevenged; but then, to make amends, the least good
Ofﬁce done to them is always repaid by them with a grateful Acknowledge-
ment.”40 In this passage, “wildness” is compensated for by a simple, but funda-
mental, integrity. Again, it would seem most likely that the ﬂip side came directly
from the observations of Mandinka traders who necessarily dealt with the Jola.
What is remarkable about this passage is the form of words that Moore
chooses. One version of the etymology of the term “Jola”—which was not in
use in the eighteenth century but became current in the nineteenth—was precisely
that of the ‘people who pay back,’ both in the literal and ﬁgurative senses.41 The
dictum that Moore reproduces seems, therefore, to have been in usage for at least
a century before ﬁnally giving rise to the ethnonym. This is an excellent illus-
tration of the ways in which pre-colonial labels later became entrenched as colo-
nial terminology. Right across Africa, the ethnonyms that came to be encoded in
colonial discourse were of African origin—sometimes designating where a par-
ticular group lived or pointing to some aspect of their lifestyle that their neighbors
found worthy of comment. What has yet to be fully appreciated is the extent to
which European stereotypes of speciﬁc “tribes” were themselves second-hand
representations.
Traders and Farmers, Ewe and Agotime
Turning to the second pairing of the Ewe and the Agotime, two differences in
the quality of the data are worth noting. The ﬁrst is that the information pertain-
ing to the Volta River hinterland is much more limited than for the Gambia
region. This is perhaps surprising because European traders came to this
stretch of coastline not much later. Moreover, the volume of slaves exported
from the Gold and Slave Coasts greatly exceeded that of the Senegambia,
40 Moore, Travels, 36.
41 There is a lack of consensus on the etymological origins of the name “Jola.” The anthropo-
logist Louis-Vincent Thomas took “Di-ola” in the language of the Jola themselves to mean “all
the visible living.” Louis-Vincent Thomas, Les Diola; essai d’analyse fonctionnelle sur une popu-
lation de Basse-Casamance, Me´moires de l’Institut Franc¸ais d’Afrique Noire (Dakar: IFAN, 1958).
Mark suggests the name is rather of Wolof origin, but without providing any further explanation, in
A Cultural, Economic and Religious History, 7. But it is also widely believed that the name comes
fromMandinka, where it means “someone who pays back.” Jonathan Vaughan Smith, “The Jolas of
Senegambia, West Africa: Ethnolinguistic Identity and Change across an International Border,”
Ph.D. thesis, University of Oregon, 1993, 157. This is the version I have repeatedly encountered
in the ﬁeld.
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which meant that there was a steady ﬂow of European visitors.42 The difference
is that the English, the Dutch, and the Danes tended to conﬁne their trading
operations to the coastline, working out of castles and forts (as along the
Gold Coast) or more temporary factories east of Accra. The Volta River was
an important conduit for trade coming down from what is now northern
Ghana. Slaves also came from through ‘Krepi’ (roughly northern Eweland),
while salt and imported goods were transported upriver.43 But it was Africans
who generally traveled to the European factories. The Danes attempted to
control the Volta River trade at the expense of their European rivals. In addition
to their castle adjoining those of the English and the Dutch at Accra, they estab-
lished trading posts at Ada and Keta at the mouth of the river and the lagoon,
respectively.44 But these were never intended to provide a bridgehead for entry
into the interior, which remained terra incognita from just a little way inland.
Hence maps down to the early nineteenth century provide relatively accurate
information about the location of the Akan polities of Awkamu and Akyem
west of the Volta, and those of the coastline itself, but east of the Volta blank
spaces are the order of the day until one reaches the western marches of
Dahomey. Hence Labat’s description of the coastline in the late 1720s com-
ments at length on the coastal rivalries between “Coto or Lampi” (Keta/
Ladoku), Popo, Whydah (‘Judah’), and its new overlord, Dahomey. But he
says nothing about the peoples who lived less than a day’s travel inland from
Keta. On the maps that accompany the book, the mouth of the Volta is
shown, but the text simply states: “We do not go up this river and its course
is unknown to us.” (“On ne remonte pas dans cette rivie`re et sons cours nous
est inconnu.”)45 It would appear that the ﬁrst detailed map of the interior,
that of Thonning, dates from as late as 1802.46
By contrast with the Senegambia, the European push along the Gold and
Slave coasts was lateral. Hence whereas it was peoples of the coastline of
42 According to Lovejoy’s estimates, 201,400 slaves were exported across the Atlantic from the
Senegambia in the eighteenth century, as compared with 677,400 from the Gold Coast and
1,278,600 from the Bight of Benin (largely synonymous with the Slave Coast). Paul Lovejoy,
Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), table 3.4, 50.
43 On the Volta River trade, see Marion Johnson, “Asante East of the Volta,” Transactions of the
Historical Society of Ghana VIII, 1965; and D.J.E. Maier, Priests and Power: The Case of the
Dente Shrine in Nineteenth-Century Ghana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).
44 Per Hernaes, Slaves, Danes and African Coast Society (Trondheim: University of Trondheim,
Department of History, 1995), 33.
45 Pe`re Labat, Voyage du Chevalier des Marchais en Guine´e, isles voisines et Cayenne fait en
1725, 1726 et 1727 (4 vols.) (Paris, 1730). For a measured assessment of the utility of such
maps, see Rene´ Baesjou, “The Historical Evidence in Old Maps and Charts of Africa with
Special Reference to West Africa,” History in Africa 15 (1988): 1–83.
46 I am grateful for the advice of Ole Justesen on this speciﬁc point of detail. See also Daniel
Hopkins, “Peter Thonning’s Map of Danish Guinea and Its Use in Colonial Administration and
Atlantic Diplomacy 1801–1890,” Cartographica 35, 3–4 (1998): 99–122.
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the Casamance who were largely unfamiliar to the Europeans—such as the
inhabitants of the islands of Karone—the position was reversed in the trans-
Volta. Of course, African traders who came to the trading factories conveyed
political information that Europeans valued, and the quality of this information
improved in the nineteenth century, but information about ‘Krepi’ was patchy.
To compound the problem for the historian, there has never been a systematic
attempt to collect the oral traditions of the Ewe-speaking peoples and their
neighbors. Early colonial ofﬁcials put together some local histories that have
survived, but there are signiﬁcant gaps in the coverage.47 As a result, what
we can say with conﬁdence about identities in the trans-Volta is much more ten-
tative than for the Senegambia.
The second point is a more intriguing one. Whereas Europeans writing about
the Senegambia deployed a language that translates very easily into the modern
vocabulary of ethnicity, this was not the case along the coastline east of Accra.
The referents here are kingdoms and chiefdoms, as they are in Moore’s text,
but what is lacking is a countervailing tendency to highlight cultural features
that traversed political borders. It might be argued that this is an optical allusion,
in that attributes were appended to the polities themselves—hence the “warlike
Dahomeans” who stalk the pages of many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
accounts—which were construed as akin to European nations. But Europeans
were quite capable of distinguishing political boundaries from ethnic markers.
Hence, Mandinkas and Jolas inhabited different political units, but were routinely
grouped as “Mandingos” and “Floops” with opposing characteristics attributed to
each. Whereas Ewe-speaking and Twi-speaking peoples were equally separated
into discrete political units, Europeans never referred to Akan or Ewe qualities,
but rather to Akims, “Lampis,” Popos, and Krepis who might fare better at
warfare or trade, but were otherwise not that dissimilar. It is true that the
Danes sometimes described the “Krepi” as being the ideal slaves, but this was
a vague designation for peoples of the trans-Volta. It referred to both northern
Ewe-speakers and a much larger cluster of non-Ewe peoples. “Krepi” was
never used with the particularity that “Mandingo” was. It is my contention
here that different European usage reﬂects an underlying reality. Namely,
whereas there were well-demarcated ethnic frontiers between Mandinka, Jola,
and Fula that were reinforced by visible differences of economy, material
culture and to some extent religion, differences were not mutually reinforcing
in the case of the eastern Gold and Slave Coasts. In principle, littoral commu-
nities who ﬁshed and panned salt could be distinguished from those that
farmed maize and yams further inland, but the networks of trade and settlement
blurred the distinctions.
47 The British collected some data, which is preserved in the District Record Books, Public
Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD), ADM 39/4/4, “District Record
Book (Ho).”
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Bearing these points in mind, let us now turn to Ewe and Agotime relations in
closer detail. The traditions of the Ewe-speaking peoples are fairly clear on many
of the fundamentals of their history. They refer to successive migrations from the
east, and place particular store by a tradition that they all once resided at the town
of Notsie before dispersing to their present locations, where they divided into sep-
arate chieftaincies (duk c, sing. or duk cwo, pl.). They typically refer to having
encountered pre-existing inhabitants who were defeated and chased away.
Some of the latter apparently survived as the Central Togo minorities that
inhabit the Togoland hills.48 Although the idea of a mass dispersal from Notsie
is hardly credible, available evidence supports the steady westward drift of Ewe-
speakers in the seventeenth century.49 The Ewe duk cwo that emerged were small
chiefdoms, typically comprising only a collection of a few villages under a
common head. The exceptions were coastal Anlo, which grew into a much
larger entity, and Peki, both of which beneﬁted by adopting aspects of Akan mili-
tary tactics. Because the dominance of the Notsie meta-narrative may be of rela-
tively recent origin, one should be cautious about reading a deeply rooted sense of
Ewe identity into the past.50 But, as withMandinkamigrations into Kombo, com-
munities shared memories of connections between themselves, often embodied in
stories of segmentation at some point in the migration process. In addition, tem-
porary alliances were forged between Ewe polities. In 1833–1834, most (but not
all) of the Krepi duk cwo rallied together under the leadership of Peki, to cast off
their subject status to Akwamu and hence Asante. Most subsequently resisted the
Asante invasion of the trans-Volta in 1868–1871 that was intended to
re-subjugate the trans-Volta. It would be making too great a claim to say that a
common Ewe consciousness was born at this point. But these events certainly
did leave a lasting imprint on the Ewe-speaking peoples and cooperation provided
a template for Ewe nationalists in the twentieth century.
The northern Ewe polities had more powerful neighbors, but they also lived
next to smaller collectivities. These included an Adangbe diaspora.51 The
latter seem to have come from the vicinity of Ada, but sought sanctuary from pol-
itical violence in the late seventeenth century by relocating east of the Volta. Scat-
tered across what is now the Volta Region of Ghana and southern Togo are small
Adangbe groups who are mostly indistinguishable from their Ewe neighbors
today. The largest is the Agotime who share borders with some of the larger
48 Paul Nugent,Myths of Origin and the Origin of Myth: Local Politics and the Uses of History
in Ghana’s Volta Region, Working Papers on African Societies, no. 22 (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch,
1997).
49 I adopt the time-scale of D.E.K. Amenumey, The Ewe in Pre-Colonial Times (Accra: Sedco,
1986), 11–12.
50 Sandra Greene, Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History of Meaning and Memory
in Ghana (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 20.
51 For a survey, see Paul Nugent, “A Regional Melting Pot: The Ewe and Their Neighbours in
the Ghana-Togo Borderlands,” in Benjamin Lawrence, ed., A Handbook of Eweland: The Ewe of
Togo and Benin (Accra: Woeli, 2005), 29–43.
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Ewe-speaking duk cwo, notably Ho and Adaklu in Ghana and Agu in Togo. The
Agotime are better represented in the historical record than most. They make
their ﬁrst appearance in Danish sources in the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth
century.52 A letter from the Danish factor at Keta in 1749 referred to Kwahu
traders having arrived at Agotime in order to purchase slaves and ivory, and
relayed their demands for more trade goods (including iron bars and knives) to
be able to exchange for them.53 The following year, an Agotime caboceer
(roughly speaking, “chief”), Keteku, sent a message promising to settle some out-
standing palavers with Anloga and Keta in order that his people could bring their
trade goods southwards. He promised to come with traders from four or ﬁve
Agotime towns and to bring thirty slaves and a supply of ivory with him.54
A subsequent 1751 letter reported that the “Agotim Caboceer,” presumably
the same Keteku, had indeed sold a quantity of slaves and ivory at Klikor.55 A
correspondence from 1754 on the subject of bad debts refers to credit having
been extended to Agotime traders by the Danish factors. What this conﬁrms is
that the Agotime were never simply suppliers to the Akwamu and Anlo who
dominated the trade in slaves, ivory, dried ﬁsh, coastal salt, and imported
goods, but became signiﬁcant players in their own right. Akwamu traders
handled most of the salt trade towards the borders of Dahomey, but Agotimes
also participated in this trade, which modern traditions attribute to a much
deeper historical association with the salt making in their original coastal home-
land.56 Signiﬁcantly, Agotimes today recall a historic association with other
Adangbe settlements that were conveniently located on the main trade route
linking the Volta River with Ane´cho and Dahomey. In short, the Agotime
carved out a niche for themselves as traders, operating along both the north-south
and east-west axes. By contrast, their northern Ewe neighbors were renowned
more for their success as farmers. Part of what was traded down the Volta was
agricultural surplus produced by these dedicated Ewe agriculturalists, such as
yams, millet, and cotton. The Agotime, who had settled in an area that was
reputed to be rather dry, seem to have taken a pride in not working the land.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, trading and warfare tended to be
complementary. Slaves were one of the commodities that could be traded for
52 Cornevin’s timing of the movement of the main body of Agotimes to the period after 1776
does not correspond with the Danish records. Robert Cornevin, Histoire du Togo (Paris: Editions
Berger-Levrault), 108.
53 Entry XI 84 for 5 May 1749, in Ole Justesen, ed., Danish Sources for the History of Ghana,
1657–1754 (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences, 2005), 766.
54 Sandra Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change, 37. Entry XL 108, dated Nov. 1750, in
Justesen, Danish Sources, 798.
55 Entry XI 116, dated 3 Feb. 1751, in ibid., 815.
56 Ray Kea, “Akwamu-Anlo Relations c. 1750–1813,” Transactions of the Historical Society of
Ghana X (1969): 59. It is claimed that before they began their inward migration the Agotime were
involved in the salt trade from the Songhaw lagoon. Nene Noe Keteku, “Short History of the Ago-
times” (unpub. MS in author’s possession), 1–2.
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the guns that were needed to maintain one’s position in a regional system of
power. But trade was always a risky business, as is reﬂected in the story of
one Tete from Agotime-Kpetoe who ended up being one of Koelle’s linguistic
informants in Freetown in the mid-nineteenth century. Tete recalled that he
had been enslaved by people from just south of Agu—presumably he was
“panyarred” en route—in order to settle a debt owed by another Kpetoe
man.57 He was sold at the port of “Girefe,” almost certainly the Dahomean
port of Whydah,58 where the slave trade continued through to the mid-nineteenth
century. Agotimes today are fond of the claim that they dominated most of their
Ewe neighbors because of their pursuit of war as a vocation. This is plausible
given that some of the slaves the Agotime traded would have been military cap-
tives. There is also evidence the Agotime reputation for martial prowess was
credited by their neighbors. Hence the spark that ignited the Krepi rebellion
against Akwamu in 1833 was a war between two Ewe duk cwo in which the
Agotime were recruited to ﬁght.59 The fundamental point here is that the combi-
nation of trade and warfare set the Agotime somewhat apart from their northern
Ewe neighbors who took pride in their working of the soil. Nevertheless, this
ethnic frontier was far more permeable than the Mandinka/Jola one, for
reasons I will now elaborate upon.
Contemporary Agotime traditions tend to be rendered as if a single group of
Adangbes migrated from their original homeland and then doubled back,
leaving some of their peoples behind in the shape of scattered settlements that
remain in Togo. The present Agotime head chief, Nene Noe Keteku, insists
that his people fought the Agu-Ewe and the Adaklu-Ewe and thereby established
the right to settle at their present location.60 By contrast, Adaklu traditions recall
that the Adangbe strangers requested land from them, and were told to settle at a
place where a particular kind of palm tree, the fan palm or agoti, grew in profu-
sion. Living amongst the palm trees (literally, “agoti-me”), the settlers came to be
known as Agotime rather than as Adangbe (or Adampe). Whether this was a
landlord-stranger relationship, of a kind that is standard across West Africa, or
one that was based on conquest, is at the heart of a bitter dispute between the
Agotime and the Adaklu to this day.61 Keteku’s account is one that takes pride
57 Entry in “Introductory Remarks,” listed under “Adampe” within “Dahomean or Slave Coast
Languages,” in Sigismund Wilhelm Koelle’s Polyglotta Africana, Paul Hair and David Dalby, eds.
(Graz: Akademische Druk, 1963), 4. “Panyarring” was a recognized procedure for recovering debts
by seizing a debtor or his kinsmen. If the debt was not settled, the person might be sold as a slave.
58 I am grateful to Robin Law for conﬁrmation on this point.
59 Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change, 75.
60 Keteku, “Short History.”
61 It resurfaced in the run-up to the 2004 elections in Ghana when the creation of a new district,
separate from Ho, led to a dispute over the site of its capital. The Adaklus insisted that because they
were the landowners they should be granted the district capital. This was supposed to happen, but
the decision was overturned and Kpetoe was selected instead. This produced a tremendous amount
of ill feeling in which deep history came to the fore.
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in the military prowess of the Agotime, but it also accepts that they became
mixed with various Ewe peoples as they established their locally dominant pos-
ition. The traditions of particular settlements suggest that Agotime was a compo-
site society made up of not just of an Adangbe core, but other fragments as well.
Of the ten constituent units that Robert Cornevin identiﬁed in Togo—the towns
of Adame, Ando, Amoussoukope, Agoudouvou, Adjakpa, Batome, Zukpe, Let-
soukope, Nyitoe, and Kpodjahon—Ando and Nyitoe are typically described
today as “not pure Agotime.”62 The Andos were Ewes who seem to have
been forced into a client status, while the Nyitoe apparently came from
Adaklu. Although nobody is keen to advertise the fact today, Batome was a
slave village belonging to a war-chief of Kpetoe (now in Ghana). The Agoue
clan in Kpetoe is also allegedly made up of people who were originally captives
from Agu, and at least one other village can tell a similar story.
Over the course of the twentieth century, there has been a bitter rivalry between
Kpetoe and the village of Afegame (also in Ghana) that claims the headship for
itself. The Afegames insist that they are “pure Adangbe” whereas the Kpetoes
are a me´lange of disparate peoples. Whereas this is intended as a damning criti-
cism, Keteku’s version of events takes pride in this depiction because it underlines
the military success of the core Adangbe group from the time of their arrival in the
area. In this interpretation, the Afegame are cast as losers in the distribution of the
spoils. InKeteku’s words: “TheAndo andAtsi tribe remnants, mostlywomen and
children were captured and sold into slavery. The beautiful women were forced to
marry the Leh [Adangbe] men. Legend had it that the marriage of such women
brought a lot of family misunderstandings and that was the reason for most
clans leaving Wenuam [Afegame] to put up new villages and settlements.”63
On this decidedly non-essentialist reading of history, non-Adangbes became
Agotime through processes connected with slavery, marriage, or settlement.
This chimes in quite nicely with way in which the people of Nyitoe today
counter the insistence on the part of the inhabitants of the twin-town of
Zukpe that they are not pure Agotimes and hence cannot enjoy rights to a sub-
stantive chief. Their riposte is that nobody can claim to be pure Agotime: the
point is that the collective name of Agotime refers to people who ended up
living ‘amongst the palm trees’ and says nothing about a single origin or
culture. Such renditions of the past do make the best sense of Agotime
history. Apart from anything else, they underscore the crucial point that
while the Agotime distinguished themselves from their Ewe neighbors by
virtue of their calling to trade and warfare, these same activities created
62 Cornevin, Histoire du Togo, 61. The author notes that the Adames came from the borders of
Lake Aheme, having ﬂed from Dahomean attacks. He also asserts that the Zukpe and Nyitoe people
came from Lekpo on the Volta, but these villages deny that they are of the same origin. Nene Keteku
refers to the Nyitoe people speaking a variant of Adaklu-Ewe, which may indicate that they were
there when the Agotime arrived. Interview, Kpetoe, 26 Mar. 2001.
63 Keteku, “Short History,” 7.
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tributaries, marital alliances, and slaves, inevitably converting Ewes into Ago-
times. Hence, the border between was necessarily a permeable one in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. A similar process characterized the relations
between Bainuks, on the one hand, and Mandinka and Jola on the other,
whereas between Mandinka and Jola, it was absent.
T H E S H I F T I N G C O N T O U R S O F I D E N T I T Y C . 1870 – 19 30
In both of the cases under consideration, the last decades of the nineteenth
century were characterized by upheavals that provided some of the motive and
much of the excuse for the imposition of European rule. Colonialism created a
framework within which Africans had the occasion to think about themselves
in relation to neighbors, some of whom were previously unknown to them.
But it is the contention of this article that the element of radical transformation
can be exaggerated. Whereas some writing within the ‘invention of tribes’
genre places emphasis on the hardening of previously permeable boundaries
of identiﬁcation—the colonial ‘tribe’—these two case studies exemplify the
opposite: that is, where group boundaries were previously hard they were
more easily breached and where they were already permeable they became yet
more so. It is also worth underlining that two of the four names that became colo-
nial ethnonyms—Mandinka and Agotime—were current in the eighteenth
century, whereas a third—Jola—was in place by the nineteenth. Only the
‘Ewe’ ethnonym can be attributed to the colonial period proper. Map 2, which
dates from 1884, represents one of the earliest usages of the term.
Naturally, the meanings attached to these labels shifted over time. Indeed, what
I wish to argue in the remainder of this article is that the term “invention”
obscures precisely the ways in which colonial identities involved mutations of
older forms of signiﬁcation.64 In this context, it is important not to take the colo-
nial conceit at face value. Coercive force evidently had its limits, as European
administrators were painfully aware. But to suggest that the battle was fought
on a cultural plane merely displaces the underlying problem. While Europeans
were militarily relatively strong, in every other respect they were vulnerable.65
In order to tweak African societies in the desired directions, Europeans were
forced to lean heavily on African informants in every sense of the word. Even
the missionaries, who claimed to be wiping the slate clean, borrowed freely
from African epistemologies, rather than introducing radically new ones.66 In
64 Ranger suggests the term “imagination” is not much of an improvement. See his “Invention of
Tradition Revisited.”
65 Symptomatic of this problem is the position outlined in Nicholas Dirks, “Introduction: Colo-
nialism and Culture,” in Nicholas B. Dirks, ed., Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor: Comparative
Studies in Society and History Book Series, University of Michigan Press, 1992), 1–25.
66 Birgit Meyer brings this out particularly well in Translating the Devil: Religion and Moder-
nity Among the Ewe in Ghana (Edinburgh and London: Edinburgh University Press for Inter-
national Africa Institute, 1999).
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MAP 2 Map ofGold and Slave Coasts,WithMouth ofVolta River Shown, Accompanying Pe`re Labat,
VoyageduChevalierdesMarchais enGuine´e, isles voisines etCayenne fait en1725, 1726et 1727 (1730).
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the turbulent years of the early twentieth century, Europeans therefore became
captive to African ways of seeing. When they ﬁnally settled down in the interwar
period to remake the African world in their own image, they drew on the writings
and administrative ﬁles of an earlier generation of military ofﬁcers and civil ofﬁ-
cials. What had been quietly forgotten was the African provenance of much of
this collected wisdom. This was especially evident when it came to the question
of “tribes” because attributes that were appended to the latter had a history in and
of themselves. And that was a history largely made by Africans.
Islam and Ethnicity in the Gambia-Casamance Borderlands
In thewestern Senegambia, it is impossible to separate the imposition of European
rule from a series of religious conﬂicts that brought devastating consequences
from the mid-nineteenth century. These began as a struggle for power within
the Mandinka kingdoms between Muslim reformers (the “marabouts”) and
rulers whowere either animists (“Soninkes”) or whowere accused of backsliding.
The proximity of Kombo to the British trading post at Cape St. Mary’s meant that
the latter came to hold the balance of power in a struggle between Soninke rulers
and their Muslim subjects. This was eventually resolved in favor of the marabou-
tic cause in 1875, following which Kombo came under the control of one Fode´
Sylla. In practical terms, the last barriers to conversion amongst the Mandinka
had been removed in Kombo, if not in Narang and Fogny Jabangkunda to the
south. Sylla proceeded to extend his jihad, attacking not merely the remaining
Soninke outposts, but his Jola neighbors as well. On the face of things, the objec-
tive was still to bring about conversion, but in practice, Sylla’s forces were
engaged in raiding for slaves who could then be then sold eastwards.67 Sylla jus-
tiﬁed his actions to the Europeans on the basis that the Jola “worshipping of idols”
represented a religious affront and thus made them fair game. The havoc created
by Sylla posed a threat to European commerce, with the eventual upshot that the
British invaded Kombo and ousted him in 1894. The British and the French had
already agreed to a paper partition in 1889.With the troublesomemarabout ﬁnally
out of the way, their western border could be demarcated.
The violence of the later nineteenth century further hardened the line of divi-
sion between Mandinka and Jola communities. British and French ofﬁcials
repeatedly observed that the Jola were hostile both to the Mandinka and to
Islam, associating each of them with violent enslavement. This opposition
was, if anything, made that much sharper by the initial expedient of resorting
to Mandinka chiefs to govern Jola populations. The French faced a constant
struggle to secure compliance from Jola villages where demands for taxes
67 On Sylla, see David Skinner, “Islam in Kombo: The Spiritual and Militant Jihad of Fode
Ibrahim Ture,” paper delivered at the African Studies Association conference, 1990. See also
Paul Nugent, “Cyclical History in the Gambia/Casamance Borderlands: Refuge, Settlement and
Islam from 1880 to the Present,” Journal of African History 48, 2 (2007): 221–43.
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repeatedly elicited a deﬁant response.68 The reasoning was therefore that,
however unpopular Mandinka chiefs might be, they might succeed in raising
taxes and imposing law and order upon the “anarchic” Jola. But demands for
tax, and later for military conscripts, simply conﬁrmed the most negative
Jola image of the Mandinka. Hence when the French grip faltered during the
First World War, Mandinka chiefs were forcibly expelled by Jola villages
seeking to restore their independence. When the French managed to restore
order by military re-conquest, they rectiﬁed their earlier mistake by creating
a new stratum of Jola chiefs.
British images of the Jola mirrored those of the French. In the words of one ofﬁ-
cial: “There is only one name for the Jolah, ‘Savage’ and he must be treated as
such; naturally it will take many years to work him up to the standard of other
tribes.”69 The British began by trying to use Mandinka chiefs to govern refractory
Jola villagers and similarly bemoaned the failure of the experiment. British ofﬁ-
cials blamedmany of their problems on Jolas who had crossed the border, carrying
with them a penchant for thwarting European ofﬁcers. A report from 1901
observed that the murder of Mandinka traders had become quite commonplace:
“Crime in Fogni is excessive, the Jolahs they are continually committing
murders&highway robberies. The hard part of aCommissioner’swork in thisDis-
trict is his inability to make arrests, no Jolah will ever arrest another, & the Man-
dingos are afraid to; another point is that it is very hard indeed to get one Jolah to
give evidence against another.”70 Somewhat earlier than the French, the British
realized that only Jola chiefs stood a chance of winning a modicum of acceptance.
Given that religion had deﬁned the line of schism in the second half of the
nineteenth century, the subsequent turn of events could hardly have been antici-
pated. While some French ofﬁcials agreed that saving Jola ‘animists’ from the
advance of Islam would be desirable, fervent anti-clericalism led to obstacles
being placed in the way of the Catholic Church. The net result was that while
some conversion to Christianity took place south of the Casamance river, most
of the region was untouched by missionary activity. Instead, the Jola began to
convert to Islam, so that by the 1930s the religious landscape had been comple-
tely transformed. This is not the place to fully account for this sudden embrace of
Islam; sufﬁce to say that it now came to be associated with the quest for peace
and an alternative form of modernity.71 New Muslim villages were founded,
68 This is documented at length in Roche, Histoire, chs. 6–7.
69 National Archives of the Gambia, ARP 33/1, “Reports on Kombo, Foni and Kiang (1894–
99),” Report on Kombo, Fogni and Kiang for 1898–1899 by Sitwell, Travelling Commissioner,
29 June 1899.
70 NAGARP 33/2 “Reports on Kombo, Foni and Kiang (1900–01 and 1906–07),” Report from
the Travelling Commissioner, Sangster, 26 Sept. 1901.
71 On Jola conversion, see Fay Leary, “Islam, Politics and Colonialism: A Political History of
Islam in the Casamance Region of Senegal (1850–1914),” Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University,
1970; Olga Linares, “Islamic ‘Conversion’ Reconsidered,” Cambridge Anthropology 11 (1986):
4–19; Mark, A Cultural, Economic and Religious History, ch. 6.
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existing settlements changed their names to reﬂect their new religious identity,
mosques sprung up throughout the Casamance, and new forms of dress and
address were adopted. In the Gambia, where the impact of the Christian missions
was scarcely felt outside of Banjul, the story was very similar.72 In both cases, it
is not coincidental that Mauritanian marabouts spearheaded conversion because
they were devoid of the stigma that continued to be attached to the Mandinka.
Cheikh Mahfoudz, a grandson of the founder of the Fadeliyya Suﬁ order in
Mauritania, is synonymous with this rapid process of voluntary conversion.
After traveling through Senegal, Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau he was
given permission to settle in the Casamance in 1901.73 Mahfoudz is remembered
today as having spent time preaching in Jola villages, persuading people of the
error of their ways, rather than aggressively attacking “idolatry.” By contrast,
the memory of Fode´ Sylla continues to be reviled by the Jola, even as it is ven-
erated by many Mandinka.
By the Second World War, an adherence to Islam was no longer particular
to the Mandinka. On the contrary, it increasingly provided a template for
ethnic cooperation. Although the Jola were said to be less orthodox in
their observance than Mandinka, European attempts to distinguish
between them belied the reality of convergence. Crucially, adherence to
Islam provided a charter for equality based not on place of origin, but on
belief and practice. This was important because it was coupled with
migration in the interwar period, as Jola farmers from high-density areas
in Buluf went in search of farmland. Many crossed into the Gambia,
where they were welcomed by the British as part of their efforts to boost
groundnut production, while others settled just inside the Casamance
border.74 Jola incomers often built their new homes in existing Mandinka
towns where they were accepted as fellow Muslims. At the same time, Man-
dinka marabouts went in search of converts in Jola areas that it would have
been perilous even to have set foot in a matter of decades before. Their
success was the cause of some bafﬂement to European ofﬁcials who,
rather lamely, invoked Jola gullibility.75
The net result was that villages in northern Casamance and the Gambia
became ethnically mixed to a degree that would have been unimaginable in
the Gold Coast. Inevitably, there were some points of friction, particularly
72 On the history of Christianity in the Gambia, see Martha Frederiks,We Have Toiled All Night:
Christianity in the Gambia, 1456–2000 (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 2003).
73 Important biographical details on Mahfoudz are contained in the intelligence ﬁles that kept
track of the movement and activities of marabouts across French West Africa: Archives Nationals
du Senegal [ANS] 13G/384 “Casamance Affaires Politiques.” On the surveillance of marabouts,
see Christopher Harrison, France and Islam in West Africa, 1860–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
74 For further details, see Nugent, “Cyclical History.”
75 ANS 13G/384, “Casamance Affaires Politiques,” Rapport sur la situation politique de la
Casamance et programme de desarmement et de mise en main de la population (19 Aug. 1918).
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where the demographic balance shifted in favor of Jola immigrants coming to
historically Mandinka towns. But what is remarkable is the extent to which
the Mandinka felt able to accommodate immigrants on equal terms. Of
course, the softening of the ethnic boundary did not amount to a total
erasure. Perceptions of difference continued to be rooted in the preferred live-
lihood strategies of Mandinka and Jola, and reciprocated stereotypes. Euro-
pean ofﬁcials embellished these well-worn images, but they certainly did
not fabricate them. While the British and the French routinely complained
about the laziness of Mandinka farmers, who produced groundnuts of poor
quality and insufﬁcient grain, the Jola were praised for—and evidently took
pride in—their skill as wetland rice farmers. Although the sexual division
of labor shifted somewhat with conversion, the Jola remained as wedded to
rice cultivation as ever, producing very respectable yields per acre.76 On
the other side, the Jola tended not to value trade and left it to Lebanese mer-
chants and Mandinka traders.77 Jola Muslims retained their sense of being
distinct from the Mandinka, even as they moved closer to the latter in both
spatial and religious senses. In this situation, stereotyping and greater
social proximity were natural bedfellows.
Amongst the Mandinka, the most salient identity tended to be that of the
hometown. This was especially true where the town in question had a vener-
able history, such as that of Gunjur or Kabadio. The Jola who migrated freely
for the ﬁrst time in the twentieth century acquired a heightened sense of being
“Jola” through the process of migration, although signiﬁcant dialectical
differences underlined cultural variations between the constituent subgroups.
But the village of origin retained its importance as a marker of identity and, if
anything became more salient with distance from home. Much the same could
be said of the Igbo of Nigeria, the difference being that they were much
slower in seeking to codify what it meant to be Jola.78 In the ﬁrst three
decades of the twentieth century, a Jola identity remained meaningful in its
relation to other categories—Mandinka, Fula/Fulbe, and European—much
as before. But the center of gravity remained with lower-order identities,
76 For a study that examines the impact of Islam on the division of labor, see Linares, Power,
Prayer and Production. Her calculations of yields in more recent times suggested that they com-
pared favorably with much of East and Southeast Asia prior to the Green Revolution (p. 23).
77 In his attempt to isolate speciﬁcally Jola characteristics in the 1950s, Thomas noted: “The
Diola knows nothing about commerce in the strict sense, that it is to say the business of exchange.
It is an occupation which, in his natural pride, he believes to be disgraceful, precisely because it
exempts the one who lives from it (ayasa, alanora) from working in the ﬁelds.” (“Le Diola
ignore le commerce au sens strict, c’est- a`-dire l’exploitation des e´changes. C’est une occupation
que, dans sa ﬁerte´ naturelle, il croit indigne de lui, pre´cise´ment parce qu’elle dispense celui qui
en vit (ayasa, alanora) du travail des champs.”) Thomas, Les Diola, 283.
78 The centrality of migration to Igbo identity formation has been noted by Harneit-Sievers,
Constructions of Belonging, ch. 5; and by Dmitri van den Bersselaar, “Imagining Home.”
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and amongst these was the identity associated with the chosen place of
settlement.79
Christianity and Ethnicity on the Ewe-Agotime Frontier
In the Ewe-Agotime case, the deﬁning moment was the armed invasion of the
trans-Volta by Asante, which was accompanied by the destruction of entire
villages, enslavement, and mass ﬂight into the Togoland hills. It created the
germ of the idea that the duk cwo had a common interest in uniting to defend
their common interests. The largest of the northern Ewe chiefdoms, Peki, endea-
vored to establish itself as the leader of the Krepi as Europeans displayed heigh-
tened interest in the region following the successful British invasion of Asante in
1874 and the eastwards shift of the trade routes. The Asante wars also led to a
signiﬁcant reconﬁguration of communities, as refugees returned to rebuild
their lives, as new claimants on leadership emerged, and as politico-military
structures were adapted in order to forestall a repeat of the disaster. In
Agotime, the evidence would suggest that there had never been chieﬂy lines,
but rather that ‘big men’ had risen to prominence at particular conjunctures.
Before the Asante invasion, the Agotime had just such a leader (a war chief,
or avaﬁa), by the name Akoto, but in the early 1870s he ceded leadership to a
younger ﬁgure, Agbovi, who led a relatively successful guerrilla campaign.
The experience of the Asante occupation fostered alliances and generated lines
of fracture between those who had fought the Asante and those who had colla-
borated. Hence the Agotime came to enjoy a close relationship with the Ewes of
Ho, with whom they had resisted the Asante forces, whereas the Adaklu stood
accused of having led the enemy directly to them. The question of ethnicity
was not salient because the alliances and cleavages cut across Ewe/non-Ewe
lines. Equally, the attempts by the rulers of Peki to speak for all the Krepi chief-
doms failed because most of the Ewe and non-Ewe duk cwo jealously guarded
their sovereignty.
After the proclamation of a German protectorate at the coast in 1884, the
British and the Germans competed in signing treaties of protection in the trans-
Volta.80 Each of the duk cwo struck a deal in accordance with its own perceived
self-interest. When it became clear that they were stacking up claims to the
same areas, the British and the Germans agreed to a negotiated settlement.
79 A heightened sense of Jola sub-nationalism in the Casamance only surfaced in the period after
Senegalese independence. But what is perhaps worth underlining about the Mouvement des Forces
De´mocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) is that its target was never the Mandinka, who it endea-
vored to recruit into its guerrilla army, but the Wolof of the northern half of Senegal. In that sense,
the positive interaction between Jola and Mandinka at the start of the century has had enduring
consequences.
80 Nugent, Smugglers, 21–23. For a detailed treatment, see William Hudson Bryars, “The Evol-
ution of British Imperial Policy on the Volta, 1857–1897: From Informal Opportunism to Formal
Occupation,” Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1994.
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Some confusion surrounded Peki’s territorial limits, but the matter was resolved
by the 1890 Heligoland Treaty. This drove a border through Eweland, with Peki
proper placed in the Gold Coast, while the rest of northern Eweland passed to
German control. All of the minorities, including the Agotime, were deposited in
German Togo, while the Volta River henceforth deﬁned the international
boundary north of Peki.
On the face of things, the Ewemight appear to typify an invented tribe. Indeed,
Claude Welch’s classic study of the Ewe uniﬁcation movement preﬁgures much
of the writing in this vein. It makes the point that whereas the Ewe had never been
united, colonial rule brought with it the socio-economic forces which helped the
Ewe to conceive of themselves as a single people divided by artiﬁcial colonial
borders.81 In Welch’s account, the Bremen Mission was instrumental because it
created a single written version of the Ewe language, based on the coastal
Anlo dialect, which could be disseminated through church and school.82 The
Mission played a crucial integrative role because it operated on the two sides
of the Gold Coast/German Togo border. Birgit Meyer’s study of the church in
Peki adds something to Welch’s account because it underlines the signiﬁcance
that the Ewe language held for the missionaries. According to the biblical story
of the Tower of Babel, mankind lost its ability to freely communicate as divine
retribution. In Eweland, the scattering was supposedly reﬂected in quite differ-
ent dialectical forms of the Ewe language. The missionaries’ task was therefore
to bring these dialects together to create a united Ewe language that could be
used by to reestablish a bond with the creator.83 This linguistic work presup-
posed a certain amount of codiﬁcation to turn standard Ewe into a ﬁtting recep-
tacle for the word of God. Sandra Greene reveals that the missionaries did not
stop with linguistic standardization, but also disseminated the story of a
common origin at Notsie to build a sense of shared identity amongst the Ewe
subgroups.84 Those who took up the cause of Ewe uniﬁcation after the
Second World War were the products of a mission education. Welch’s work
also places importance on the commercial interaction between different parts
of Eweland in the colonial period. The substantial German investment in road
and railways certainly brought the constituent parts of Eweland closer together,
a point that is elaborated upon in a new monograph by Benjamin Lawrence.85
81 Claude Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Uniﬁcation in West Africa
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 42.
82 Welch,Dream of Unity, 47–51. Most of the business of the church was conducted in Ewe, and
the Bible was translated in 1912.
83 Meyer, Translating the Devil, 57–60. For a more general history of the Bremen mission, see
Werner Ustorf, Bremen Missionaries in Togo and Ghana, 1847–1900 (Legon: Christian Council of
Ghana, 2002).
84 Greene, Sacred Sites, 29.
85 Welch, Dream of Unity, 61; Benjamin Lawrance, Locality, Mobility and “Nation”: Peri-
Urban Colonialism in Togo’s Eweland, 1900–1960 (Rochester, N.Y.: Rochester University
Press, 2007), ch. 1.
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However, the Ewe turn out to be a rather poor example of an invented tribe.
Attempts to promote the idea of a common Ewe ethnicity were certainly made
in the interwar years, following the re-partition of German Togo between
Britain and France as League of Nations mandatory powers.86 The impetus
came from French Togoland, but it gained little support from beyond the
capital of Lome´. In the 1940s, a fully-ﬂedged Ewe uniﬁcation movement
emerged, appealing to Ewe peoples across the Gold Coast, British Togoland,
and French Togoland. But it singularly failed to win support from its target con-
stituency. The reasons are complex and varied, but a fundamental one is that
lower-order identities, based on the individual duk cwo, turned out to be more
salient than an overarching attachment to being Ewe. In the long run, the
effects of missionary activity were actually to reinforce a sense of local pride as
much as forging a pan-Ewe consciousness. From an early stage, converts
sought to rebuild their villages as model Christian communities with churches,
schools, and well-maintained public spaces. This contributed to the emergence
of a tradition of competitive self-help for which the Ewe are renowned to this
day. Also, that the leaders of the Ewe uniﬁcation movement were predominantly
Anlo rankled, in part because of the latter’s support for the earlier Asante invasion.
Moreover, being Ewe did not mean all that muchwhen there was no other identity
against which it was counter-posed. Ewe nationalists tried to turn the border itself
into the external threat, but given that so many Ewes beneﬁted from the contra-
band trade this proved an unrewarding strategy.87 In a nutshell, when it comes
to the matter of identity in Eweland, there was far more continuity than change.
Whereas the Ewe case is well documented, the Agotime have been pretty much
written out of the historical record, being the greatest casualties of the colonial par-
tition. Following the collapse of Asante power east of the Volta, Anlo traders
settled and became Agotime in time-honored fashion. However, German govern-
ance changed many of the rules of the game. They created a head chief who was
not drawn from one of the war leaders. The acquisition of fresh supplies of slaves
was cut off, and some of the peoples who would previously have held a tributary
status were hived off. Although the eastern Agotime were close to the railhead at
Amoussoukope, colonial trade accorded greater importance to the Ewe language,
thereby reinforcing the policy of the Bremen Mission. Although Adangbe
remained a spoken language, it enjoyed no currency in the marketplace or the
church.88 In the long run, this culminated in the decline of spoken Adangbe, so
that only three small villages still speak it today. The ﬁnal insult came with the
partition of German Togo in 1919, which split Agotime into two unequal
halves. Whereas Kpetoe and Afegame were placed in British Togoland, most
86 Ibid., ch. 5; Nugent, Smugglers, ch. 5.
87 Ibid., 166–68.
88 Even in those minority communities that played an important role in the history of the Bremen
mission, notably Avatime and Akpafu, Ewe took precedence.
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of the Agotimes were deposited in French Togoland. The latter were not adminis-
tered together, but rather split up and placed under Ewe canton chiefs, while across
the border the British policy of amalgamation forced the Kpetoe head chief to
accept the paramountcy of Ho. By the 1930s, Agotime had effectively been
wiped off the map. Of course, ordinary Agotimes went about their business as
before—marrying and trading as if borders did not much matter—but there was
no longer a space in which it was possible to express or performAgotime identity.
In the long run, thismade a difference because the Agotimewere reduced to being
a kind of proxy Ewe group. It was only in the 1990s that local actors, led by Nene
Keteku himself, sought to restore a pride in being Agotime through a cross-border
festival intended to rekindle an interest in a shared history and membership of an
Adangbe diaspora.
C O N C L U S I O N
Debates about African ethnicity have tended to bear more than a passing resem-
blance to those surrounding the origins of nationalism. Colonial administrators,
missionaries, and early anthropologists were deﬁnitely of a primordialist persua-
sion, whereas academic writing over the last three decades has tended to assume
variations on a constructivist position. Although there is now a growing consen-
sus that African ethnicities were neither rooted in a timeless past nor simply colo-
nial fabrications, there is relatively little work that seeks to map the historical
trajectories of contemporary identities. This article has deployed a comparison
of the Mandinka/Jola and Ewe/Agotime cases in order to reveal how it is possible
to trace the shifting contours of identity back to at least the early eighteenth
century. In the former case, a distinction between Mandinka and Jola (or
Floop) was relayed by European writers, who were evidently relying on their
African informants rather than giving vent to the ﬁgments of their imaginations.
But this expression of identity was evidently situational, and in most respects
lower-order identities were more salient. In the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth
century, Mandinka and Jola came to share a religion and the same community
spaces, which would previously have been unthinkable. Although the edge
was taken off their relationship, a sense of difference remained ingrained, as
did the identiﬁcation with village/town of origin. In the Ewe/Agotime case,
there had always been much greater interaction. The Agotime were allied with
some Ewe duk cwo, while waging war and taking slaves from others. Indeed,
their polity prospered by assimilating Ewe slaves and adding tributary villages.
One might say that the Agotime had all the makings of a colonial tribe, but par-
tition ultimately made this impossible, reducing them to the status of being proxy
Ewes. Insofar as the focus of Ewe identity remained the duk c, the Agotime con-
formed to a broader pattern. In none of this history does it make sense to talk of a
colonial invention of tribes: some of the dimensions of twentieth-century identi-
ties can be traced back much further, while in other instances the consolidation of
ethnic identities failed to take proper shape before the 1940s.
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